Cover: Original editorial illustration commissioned by Kandaka, 2026. It is a symbolic future service, not a documentary image or depiction of an existing facility. No survivor is shown.

Research refreshed: 22 September 2026. Precise nationwide staffing, locations and chains of command cannot be verified safely during the war. The proposal below is an institutional design, not a claim that such a complete service currently exists.

Why Policewomen Matter—and Why a Complete Protection System Matters More

A police station can be the first door to safety—or the place where a survivor learns never to ask the state for help again.

The difference is not simply whether a woman is sitting behind the desk. It is whether the person who answers believes the survivor, protects privacy, understands trauma, can arrange urgent medical care, preserves evidence lawfully, keeps a child away from an alleged abuser and reaches a prosecutor who will act. It is whether the police themselves can be investigated when the accused wears a uniform.

Sudan needs many more women with real authority throughout any future civilian police service. It also needs specialized investigators for violence against women and children. But adding policewomen to a damaged, militarized or unaccountable institution is not reform by itself.

The stronger proposal is to rebuild Sudan’s existing Family and Child Protection Unit system as a national Women and Child Protection Service within a reformed civilian police institution, connected in law and daily practice to health care, social workers, shelters, child-protection services, prosecutors, legal aid and independent oversight.

Its purpose must be broader than obtaining convictions. Its first tests should be whether survivors are safe, treated with dignity and able to obtain care—whether or not an adult survivor chooses to pursue a criminal case.

Sudan Is Not Starting From Zero

Sudan already built the foundation of a specialized service.

UNICEF’s final evaluation of the Family and Child Protection Units records that a 2005 police order established a technical committee for specialized child policing. The first unit began operating in Khartoum in 2007. A 2008 decision directed establishment in every state, and the service later reached the capitals of all 18 states and 62 localities. A 9696 hotline began in 2009. The Child Act of 2010 then placed the units on a statutory foundation. UNICEF evaluation.

The 2010 Child Act gave the Family and Child Protection Unit authority over offences against children and cases involving children alleged to have broken the law. It provided for specialized prosecutors and courts and procedures intended to protect children from the ordinary criminal system. Child Act 2010, English translation.

That experience should not be discarded. Sudanese officers, social workers, prosecutors, clinicians and civil-society organizations accumulated knowledge on which reconstruction can build. In 2021, UNICEF and the government launched a digital case-management tool intended to connect police, social and medical services. UNICEF on the Primero system.

The system has not vanished entirely during the war. UNICEF reported in May 2025 that FCPU personnel joined child-protection and psychosocial training in Khartoum and West Kordofan. Its mid-year 2026 report says it continued building the capacity of FCPU personnel, child prosecutors and social workers on child-friendly justice, case management and safe release and reintegration of children. A 2025 UNICEF account of family reunification in Gedaref also describes FCPU participation with local child-protection networks. UNICEF May 2025 report; UNICEF 2026 mid-year report; family-reunification account.

These sources prove continuing activity in some accessible settings—not a functioning national network. They do not establish consistent staffing, independence, transport, confidentiality or referral capacity across territory controlled by different armed actors. A unit in a state capital may be unreachable from a rural community. A hotline is useless when communications fail. A trained investigator cannot compensate for a closed clinic, absent social worker or prosecutor who never receives the file.

The question is therefore what should be preserved, transformed and independently protected when Sudan rebuilds.

The War Has Made the Need More Urgent

Sexual violence has become one of the defining harms of Sudan’s war.

OHCHR’s June 2026 trend analysis says it verified 546 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence affecting at least 838 people between 15 April 2023 and mid-April 2026. The verified victims included 539 women, 284 girls, eight men and seven boys across 16 of Sudan’s 18 states; a further 320 incidents remained under verification. Documented forms included rape, gang rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, sexual torture and trafficking. OHCHR, Three Years Too Long.

These figures do not measure the full crime. OHCHR described verified cases as only the tip of the iceberg because insecurity, stigma, retaliation, broken communications, lack of services and mistrust of justice institutions prevent reporting.

The evidence also should not be flattened into false equivalence. The UN Secretary-General’s 2026 report, covering 2025, identified the Rapid Support Forces and allied armed militias as perpetrators in the majority of verified Sudan cases while also documenting violations by other armed actors. UN Secretary-General’s 2026 report.

UNFPA estimated in early 2026 that 12.7 million people were at risk of gender-based violence. Its latest report, published in September and covering July, says partners provided GBV prevention, risk-mitigation and response services to more than 90,000 people that month across Sudan. The gap between risk and accessible specialist care remains enormous. UNFPA January–February report; UNFPA July report.

This creates a central design problem: a survivor cannot be expected to report safely to an institution controlled by, allied with or afraid of the alleged perpetrator. A specialist unit without an independent route for complaints against police, soldiers and other security personnel could conceal abuse rather than expose it.

Children face overlapping dangers: sexual violence, recruitment, abduction, trafficking, forced or child marriage, family separation, displacement, detention and destruction of schools and health services. Some children are victims or witnesses; others are accused of offences. Both require a system built around age, safety, development and legal rights—not an adult interview room with a smaller chair.

What the Service Should Be

Sudan should restore and expand the Family and Child Protection Units under a new national mandate. The name matters less than the operating model. For clarity, this proposal calls it the Women and Child Protection Service.

It should be a specialized directorate inside a reformed civilian police service, with national standards and state and locality teams. It needs trained investigators, a protected budget, a promotion track, secure rooms, vehicles, interpreters and referral coordinators. It must not become a weak desk to which ordinary stations send difficult cases and then forget them.

The service should handle:

  • sexual and domestic violence;
  • violence and exploitation affecting children;
  • child trafficking, abduction and harmful practices;
  • missing and separated children, jointly with civilian child-protection agencies;
  • children who are victims or witnesses;
  • children accused of offences, under a separate child-justice procedure; and
  • complaints implicating police or security personnel, through an independent route.

Its officers should include women and men. Survivors should be able to request a woman interviewer wherever practicable, but the state must not imply that only women protect women and children. Every officer who may receive a complaint needs basic training; specialists need much deeper investigative and child-protection expertise.

Policewomen Need Authority, Not Symbolism

Increasing the number of policewomen is necessary. A woman or girl may find it easier to disclose sexual or domestic violence to another woman, especially where social norms make discussion with an unfamiliar man difficult. Policewomen may also recognize risks that an overwhelmingly male institution has normalized.

Representation can still become theatre. Recruiting women while assigning them only reception work, searches of female detainees or administration will not change investigations. A serious programme would give women equal access to investigative training, field commands, forensics, station leadership and senior decision-making.

It would protect them inside the institution too. Confidential mechanisms are needed for officers to report harassment, discrimination and retaliation. Equal pay, maternity protections, safe accommodation and transport, suitable equipment and transparent promotion rules are operational capacity—not side issues.

Quotas may help correct exclusion, but success is not the percentage of women photographed at graduation. It is how many hold investigative and command authority, remain in service, receive promotion and change practice.

One Safe Door, Several Services

A survivor should not have to navigate six offices to obtain help.

The UN Essential Services Package treats health, police and justice, social services and coordination as one minimum response. It is a better model than a police desk operating alone. UN Women essential-services guidance.

Rwanda’s Isange One Stop Centres combine medical services, psychosocial counselling, legal assistance and temporary shelter, with investigators and prosecutors linked to cases. Rwanda reported 48 centres based in hospitals in its Beijing+30 review. Rwanda Beijing+30 report.

Sierra Leone’s Family Support Units show both the value and danger of specialization. Police units investigate gender-based violence and abuse of children and link with counsellors, courts and legal services. Yet UNICEF has reported too few officers or social workers and inadequate private space in some units. A special name cannot overcome chronic understaffing. UNICEF Sierra Leone.

Sudan should adapt, not copy. Protection hubs could sit beside selected hospitals so medical care is not delayed by a police journey. Police stations still need private reporting rooms, but a clinic must also be an entry point. Mobile teams and scheduled circuits are essential for rural communities, displacement sites and places where fixed police premises could expose survivors.

The same referral pathway must work whichever door a person enters: clinic, police unit, school, social worker, hotline, shelter or trusted civil-society organization.

What Must Happen After a Report

Immediate safety and choice

The first response should establish immediate danger, urgent medical needs, the safety of children and the survivor’s own priorities. The interviewer should explain options without pressure. Adult survivors should receive medical and psychosocial care without first filing a police complaint.

WHO’s updated training guidance does not recommend mandatory reporting to police for adult survivors of sexual assault. Health workers should offer support if a survivor chooses to report, while explaining any actual legal duties. Children require a carefully designed safeguarding standard because authorities may need to act when a child remains in danger. WHO clinical guide; WHO 2025 training curriculum.

A trained, private interview

Statements should be taken in a private, accessible room by an investigator trained in trauma, disability, child development and the effects of fear and memory. A delayed, fragmented or changing account is not proof of fabrication.

Children should be interviewed by trained specialists using age-appropriate methods. The system should minimize repetition, use recorded interviews where lawful and safe, and ensure a trusted support person or qualified guardian when in the child’s best interests. It should never force a child to confront the alleged abuser to be believed.

Health care before bureaucracy

Medical care can be time-sensitive. A survivor should not lose treatment while searching for a form, magistrate or police stamp. Qualified clinicians—not police—must obtain informed consent for examination and treatment. They should document injuries and collect forensic material only with consent and a lawful chain of custody.

Evidence matters, but health care is not an evidence-extraction service. A person who declines an examination, arrives late or has no visible injury still deserves care and a proper investigation.

A case coordinator

Each high-risk case should have a trained social worker or case manager who coordinates safety planning, transport, shelter, medical follow-up, legal aid and child services. The survivor should not have to repeat the entire account to every institution.

Emergency support may be practical: a safe telephone, transport, temporary accommodation, replacement documents, food or cash. Without it, a survivor may be forced to return to the person who caused the harm.

Prosecutors and courts that can act

Designated prosecutors should advise early on evidence and protection needs. Courts need safe waiting areas, privacy rules, protection against intimidation and ways for vulnerable witnesses to give evidence without unnecessary exposure.

Convictions should never be the only performance measure. Quotas can pressure survivors and encourage weak or coercive investigations. The system should track safety, access, timeliness, quality and reasons cases do not proceed.

When the Accused Wears a Uniform

This is the hardest test.

A unit inside the ordinary chain of command cannot credibly investigate a commander who controls its budget, postings or physical security. Complaints against police, military, intelligence personnel, prison staff or affiliated forces need a separate civilian route.

At minimum, Sudan would need:

  • an independent police complaints and inspection body with investigative powers;
  • a civilian special prosecutor able to remove cases from the accused institution;
  • reporting points outside military or police premises;
  • secure witness and whistleblower protection;
  • power to suspend an accused officer from relevant duties while protecting due process;
  • preservation of command records and evidence; and
  • public aggregate reporting that never identifies survivors.

No amnesty or internal disciplinary settlement should erase criminal responsibility for serious sexual violence. Military justice should not be the default forum for crimes against civilians.

These safeguards must apply to the protection service itself. A specialist badge is not proof of good conduct.

Children Need More Than a Crime Unit

Child protection and criminal investigation overlap, but they are not identical.

A child may need family tracing, safe alternative care, schooling, disability support or mental-health treatment even when no criminal case is possible. Police should work with a properly resourced civilian social-service authority, not try to replace it.

Children accused of offences also require protection. They should be separated from adults in custody, receive legal assistance and family or an appropriate guardian immediately, and use diversion from detention where consistent with safety and law. Detention should be a last resort and for the shortest appropriate period.

Family pressure must not decide every case. A girl should not be returned to an unsafe household because reconciliation is easier for officials. Forced settlement, compensation to relatives or marriage to an alleged rapist cannot substitute for the child’s safety and rights.

The Child Act is an important base, but a post-war legal review must examine the complete framework: sexual offences and consent, child marriage, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, protection orders, confidentiality, limitation periods, evidence rules and children associated with armed groups. Kandaka could not verify a complete, authoritative and current consolidated statute book across Sudan’s competing wartime authorities; this review must precede implementation.

Data Can Protect—or Endanger

Sudan’s earlier investment in digital case management offers a starting point. A secure system can show where referrals fail, how long cases wait and which localities lack services.

But a national database containing names, addresses and survivor histories could become a weapon if accessed by an abusive official, armed group, family member or hacker. Collect only necessary information; separate identifying data from statistics; restrict access by role; record who opens a file; encrypt transfers; provide safe offline workflows; and establish deletion and retention rules.

Public dashboards should contain anonymous aggregate data, never details that allow a person or small community to be identified. Survivors’ organizations and Sudanese women’s, child-rights and disability-rights groups should help design the system before deployment.

What the Service Must Never Do

Law and training should expressly prohibit:

  • virginity testing or any examination without informed consent;
  • demanding a police report before an adult receives health care;
  • forcing mediation, family settlement or marriage;
  • blaming a survivor for clothing, travel, delay or prior relationships;
  • revealing identity to media or community;
  • returning a child to an unsafe caregiver without assessment;
  • charging unofficial fees or demanding favors;
  • making a survivor repeat an account unnecessarily; or
  • sending an allegation against a security officer back to that officer’s command as the only remedy.

Every prohibition needs a complaint route and consequence. A poster is not accountability.

A Practical Reconstruction Sequence

First: restore a safe minimum service

Map which units, clinics, social workers, shelters, hotlines and civil-society referral networks still operate. Publish regularly updated referral information without exposing staff or survivors. Fund transport, emergency accommodation, clinical supplies and secure communications. Establish temporary independent channels for allegations involving armed or security personnel.

Second: build protection hubs

During the first two reconstruction years, restore regional hubs beside functioning hospitals and create mobile teams for underserved localities and displacement sites. Each hub needs an investigator, clinician link, social worker or case manager, prosecutor liaison and access to safe accommodation and legal aid. Referral agreements should state who acts, how quickly and who follows up.

Third: professionalize the service

Create accredited training, supervised field practice and a career track for specialist investigators. Recruit women at every level, including command. Establish forensic laboratories and evidence transport gradually with quality controls; unreliable forensics can cause injustice as easily as absent forensics.

Fourth: lock in independence

A permanent constitutional and legislative settlement should place policing under civilian law, establish independent complaints and inspection, protect prosecutorial independence and define oversight by courts, parliament and civilian bodies. Budgets and anonymous performance data should be public.

How Kandaka Would Measure Success

Reported case numbers alone mislead. An increase may mean violence rose, or that people finally trust the service. A decrease may mean success—or disappearance of access.

A better scorecard includes:

  • population and geographic coverage, including rural and displacement settings;
  • time from first contact to urgent medical care and safe accommodation;
  • percentage of agreed referrals completed;
  • number of times a survivor repeats an account;
  • accessibility for children and people with disabilities;
  • retention and promotion of women officers;
  • survivor feedback collected safely and independently;
  • time to investigate, prosecute or explain why a case cannot proceed;
  • complaints against protection personnel and their resolution;
  • outcomes when state or security personnel are implicated; and
  • recurrence of danger after the first intervention.

These figures should be independently audited and interpreted with survivor-support organizations, not used as public-relations trophies.

The Answer

Yes, Sudan needs a specialized women-and-child protection police service—but it should rebuild and transform the Family and Child Protection Units it already created.

More policewomen are vital. They can widen access, improve trust and reshape an institution from within when they possess real authority. They cannot, by themselves, provide medical treatment, safe housing, social care, forensic quality, prosecution, witness protection or independent investigation of commanders.

The real institution is therefore a chain of protection: one safe point of entry, several coordinated services and an independent route when the state itself is accused.

If Sudan rebuilds only a special desk, it may create another door that leads nowhere. If it builds the complete chain—and gives survivors power over how they use it—the state can begin to prove that protection is a right rather than a favor.

Principal Sources

Research Limitations

Research closed on 22 September 2026. Kandaka verified continued FCPU-related activity in UNICEF reporting, but not a complete nationwide unit roster, staffing levels, chain of command or safe referral map. It did not interview survivors, personnel or service providers and did not independently audit reported violence or service totals. Any implementation must begin with confidential consultation led by Sudanese women’s, survivor-support, child-rights and disability-rights organizations, a current legal review, a security assessment and a costed service map.